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BOOK REVIEW
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT. By
Gregory Zilboorg, M.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
Pp. ix, 141. $4.50.
In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association established the Isaac
Ray Award, to be given annually for the most worthy "contribution to
the improvement of the relations of Law and Psychiatry." Dr. Gregory
Zilboorg, the recipient for 1953, eminently deserved the distinction on
grounds of his previous contributions, but this volume, containing his
Isaac Ray lectures, delivered at Yale University, contributes more mis-
understanding than improvement to the relations of law and psychiatry.
The trouble is that Dr. Zilboorg is no lawyer. This is certainly no
reflection on him as a psychiatrist. But it is disastrous when he under-
takes to offer criticism and advice on criminal law. It leads him into
expressing outraged astonishment on learning that a lawsuit is not a
search for "truth" but only a weighing of the evidence presented by the
parties, misusing legal terms such as "premeditation," and failing to com-
prehend the distinction between mental disorder per se and mental disorder
of such a kind as will render one legally irresponsible for crime.
As the title indicates, much of this book is about criminal punish-
ment. Dr. Zilboorg argues ably that punishment does not eliminate
crime. He also calls attention to some sources of the drive to punish that
we may not always be aware of, such as aggressive feelings against the
accused on the part of the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury. His at-
tacks on punishment and punitive measures are so intemperate, however,
that one gets the impression he opposes all punitive measures. It is only
on more careful reading that one notes it is "rigid" punishment, or punish-
ment "pure and simple," that he denounces, and from a passing reference
in the last chapter we gather that he does approve of "restorative"
punishment.
Throughout the seven chapters, Dr. Zilboorg throws out various
observations and propositions, some of which are piquant and provoca-
tive. Others will strike some readers as shallow, dubious, or clearly
wrong. The M'Naghten rule, we are told, "intends to apply purely
moralistic criteria to a clinical or scientific problem. . . ." (p. 17). The
"duel" between the defense and the prosecution in the modern courtroom
seems "to have its psychological roots in the ancient form of justice by
combat and revenge." (p. 99). In this duel, the two "enemies" "are not
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intent on saving anybody (not even the defendant, I am tempted to say)
but only on winning their own battle, on annihilating their adversary."
The defendant "all too often stands a perfect chance of being forgotten,
since he is but a tool in the duel between two narcissisms: defense and
prosecution." (pp. 81, 82).
Cursory animadversions of this sort are the more regrettable in that
some of the subjects touched upon deserve thoughtful psychological study.
Lawyers' partisanship and the "need to win" is an example. The conse-
quences of the degree of affect that the lawyer brings to his client's
cause-in the reaction of his client, the jury, the judge, opposing counsel
and himself-present a complex psychological problem. But the investi-
gator would have to comprehend what really goes on in a lawsuit. For
example, whereas Dr. Zilboorg sees in the clash of opposing counsel a
duel between "enemies" bent on annihilating each other, David Riesman,
who knows something of law and of psychology, points out, "The 'rules
of the game' of the law are so set up that lawyers can appear to fight hard
without irretrievably hurting each other .... "' The same rules permit
lawyers to act on Shakespeare's injunction to "strive mightily but eat and
drink as friends." This kind of fraternal relationship is not only in the
interest of rational and civilized adjudication, but in the client's interest
also. Too much emotional identification with the client may only harm
his case. In a labor dispute, the management lawyer who matches his
client's fervor in damning the union "agitators" on the other side, instead
of calmly trying to effect a solution the parties can live with, may impress
the client with his "loyalty," but he may also cause him a costly and wholly
needless breakdown in labor relations.
There is one criticism Dr. Zilboorg makes of the criminal law that
lawyers have probably never heard before. It is that we bring the crimi-
nal to justice too quickly. (Our motive: "to get rid of the evildoer as
quickly as possible in order to forget the deed itself." p. 87). Most of
us had rather thought the law erred on the other side. We have heard
criticism enough of the law's delays, but never before, I believe, of its
undue dispatch. Dr. Zilboorg illustrates his point-and apparently rests
it, for he offers no other evidence-with the trial of one Bellingham,
held in England in 1812.
The law is also criticized because it acts only after the fact. Lawyers
and judges might reply that, lacking prophetic vision, we cannot do other-
wise; we cannot label a man a murderer until he has acted. Zilboorg
seems to imply that such vision can be ours if we will only consult a psy-
chiatrist. He tells us (p. 64) of a case in which a psychiatrist testified
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that a certain woman, before the court on commitment proceedings, had
an illness such that if not committed, she might very well kill her husband.
The judge nevertheless let her go free. Two days later, sure enough, she
was back, charged with having killed her husband. But while the moral
we are supposed to draw from this is obvious enough, I doubt whether
Dr. Zilboorg would really contend that the case is typical. Certainly most
psychiatrists would disclaim any such prescience for themselves.
Throughout the book, there are repeated references to the "hostility"
of lawyers toward psychiatrists, to the "chasm," the "immense canyon,"
between them. This hostility against psychiatrists that Dr. Zilboorg feels
so keenly is, I am sure, not more than half real: lawyers feel that only
the other side's experts are incompetent or venal. But even if only half
the hostility the author sees actually exists, it is too much, and we should
be working to eliminate it.
Dr. Zilboorg does make two valuable suggestions to this end: (1) "If
young lawyers were afforded the opportunity to have so-called 'lie-
detector' or 'narco-analytic' interviews with mentally healthy and men-
tally ill people, such interviews to be conducted jointly with an experienced
psychiatrist," they would understand what psychiatrists mean by human
personality, as a totality which is in constant motion and commotion, and
also what is meant by "alteration of personality"; (2) "Both the lawyer
and the psychiatrist must have a clear conception of human aggression-
conscious and unconscious." (p. 44). And he follows this up with an
excellent chapter explaining the operation of aggression, especially as it
manifests itself in criminal conduct.
That sort of thing is valuable. Understanding between the two
professions can be helped by psychiatrists' explaining psychiatric concepts
to lawyers, and by lawyers explaining legal concepts and legal procedure
to psychiatrists. A few rare individuals at home in both disciplines might
venture a synthesized critique covering both. But criticisms of legal
doctrines and procedure by psychiatrists untrained in the law will not
foster mutual understanding any more than would diatribes by psychi-
atrically ignorant lawyers abusing psycho-analysts for their ideas about
the ego and the id, death wishes, returning to the womb, and penis-envy.
HENRY WEIHOFEN*
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.

